ALTRUISM: BEING SELFLESS FOR THE THE WELL-BEING OF THE OTHER

 

ALTRUISM: BEING SELFLESS FOR THE THE WELL-BEING OF THE OTHER

 

1.0  Introduction

Thinking is always a rational progression that tries to solve the glitches of the world with renewed intelligence and comprehension. It includes a makeover not only in rationality but also in action. Altruism is one of the rational requirements of action. What is the role of the philosophy of altruism in human life? To answer this question, it is necessary first to know whether altruism a desire to benefit someone else for his or her sake rather than one’s own, even exists in humans. The reality of the philosophy of altruism has been debated, often vehemently, for centuries. The reason for the frenzied debate is that if altruism occurs, it has philosophical inferences. The certainty and existence of altruism point our energy towards the fundamental human nature; do all actions of humanity focused on benefiting ourselves? Those who carefully consider the human state often accomplish that self-interest triggers all our deeds. Even though we are self-interested beings, altruism does exist in humans. Since altruism holds a complex nature, we need a combined approach to understand it better. What I do in this first chapter is to present altruism as a philosophy of being selfless for the well-being of the other. My effort in this chapter is to discuss definitions of the philosophy of altruism, its developments, the role of philosophy of altruism in the human life, the rationale of the philosophy of altruism and ethos in the evolution of altruistic thought patterns, traditional philosophical thoughts of altruism, the religious outlook of the philosophy of altruism, motives of the philosophy of altruism, the necessity of Supererogation, reciprocity, and impartiality in the philosophy of altruism, etc.

 

1.1 What do we understand by the philosophy of altruism?

The French term ‘altruisme’ was coined by Auguste Comte in his Système de Politique Positive in 1851.[1] It combined the Latin alter with ui and literally meant ‘to this other’. The English ‘altruism’ was first introduced into Britain by George H. Lewes, a popularizer of Comte’s work, in 1853. When Comte explained his theories of phrenology in System of Positive Politics I, he presented the cerebral table by looking at the natural basis of the true general theory of affective life.[2] Auguste Comte then describes the structure and meaning of his table. According to him, there is a threefold division – a very general feature of Comte’s thought – between the heart (the loving part of the human being), the mind (the thinking part) and the character (the active part).[3] The altruism versus egoism conflict is located in the loving dimension, in which Comte distinguishes no less than ten instincts.[4] The altruistic instincts are the last of the three instincts and they have placed in the middle of the forefront of the brain: kindness first, followed by veneration, while attachment links with egoistic instincts.[5] Even though altruism is “elimination of selfish desire and egocentrism, as well as leading a life devoted to the well-being of others”[6], Comte  does not nurse egoism and altruism as two drastically contrasting instincts and tried to blend  egoism and altruism with the two intermediary tendencies: “between the direct interest of the isolated individual and true social feeling there exists an indirect interest, which is still individual but which brings each individual into relation with the other in order to obtain individual satisfaction.”[7] The action would only be called altruistic if it was done with the conscious intention of helping another which is contrary to self-interested or selfish or egoistic.[8]

Herbert Spencer too had given importance to altruism and for him, the family is a congenial context for altruistic behavior. Spencer considered altruism to be an exact form of action and not an instinct; this is clear in his definition of altruism as “all action which, in the normal course of things, benefits others, instead of benefiting self”.[9] He developed a non-conscious form of altruism. [10]  He construed in terms of the means-end relations.  Spencer apprehended an evolutionary interpretation of the growth of altruism, instead of the historical approach of Comte. Spencer appears to follow a meta-historical approach to the rise of altruism: from unconscious to conscious altruism in the family, from familial altruism to social altruism.[11] When he spoke of the cooperation, he developed four-stage birth of altruism[12] and the final stage of it is “characterized by an increase of sympathy leading to exchange of services beyond agreement”.[13]  He explained these four stages in terms of the calculus of pain and pleasure and of the way how egoists and altruists made a selection to fit their social context. Spencer rules out Comte’s motto live for others and this statement itself is as same as an egoistic motto.  He did not accept the Comte’s claim that truly social life means to live for others, objective behaviors and feelings paving the way for subjective immortality given by the life in others, that is to say, those who will remain in their memory a recollection of the objective life of members of past generations.[14] According to Spencer, egoism is the beginning stage of altruism.[15]  Altruism and egoism were treated as if they were behaviors on the same continuum through cooperation and compromise, in sharp contrast to Comte, who considered altruism to be an instinct and a value different from egoism, and who distinguished egoistic altruism from pure altruism. Their thoughts underline the idea that altruism is a rational determination to give the other.

Many other thinkers have cherished the benevolence to define altruism. For Thomas Nagel, altruism is the inclination to act for the welfares of the other.[16] Stephen Post sees altruism as unselfish delight and unlimited love in the comfort of others.[17] Daniel Batson felt altruism as an action with the motive of the happiness of the needy.[18] This sense of altruism has the taste of the agape of Christianity, Maitri, and Karuna of Buddhism, parasahayam of Hinduism. Not only action but also motivation also is the defining factor of altruism. It is an action looking forward to the well being of others at the jeopardy of ourselves without imagining any returns from others.[19] The motivation behind each action seems like an inspiration. Here I do not take into consideration certain undesirable and unforeseen consequences. A hindrance to taking action, which goes out of the control of the one who wills to act does not at all diminish the altruistic nature of his motivation. Taking risks for the good for the accomplishment of the goodness of the other is a necessary sufficient factor to qualify as altruistic behavior.[20] Here one acts out of benevolence and not out of personal gains. There are mainly two mechanisms to altruism; give worth to others and have a concern about the circumstances of others’ life.[21] When we human beings hold these two in our heart, we generate benevolence and sympathy with broadmindedness and willingness to help the needy for their well being to limit the sufferings of the suffered. If one fails to grant worthiness to others,  one will be indifferent to the needs of the needy.  Without valuing the other, no one can be altruistic.

Human beings’ certain intellectual status and long-lasting temperaments make an effect on altruism. Baston visualizes altruism as a momentary mental state lined to the perception of a particular need in another person, rather than as a lasting disposition.[22] He talks more of the philosophy of altruism than the altruists because an intellectual conflict emerges while one acts because of the mixture of motivations one holds as selfish or altruistic. It appears then sincere to speak also of altruistic or selfish temperaments according to the cerebral states that usually outweigh in a person all the phases between categorical altruism and narrow-minded selfishness.[23] The Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson said about altruism that it should not be an action arise out of compassion or gratitude, it should be fixed humanity to the others whom our influence can extend.[24] We tend to define goodness as a principle or dogma but it is more than that, a way of existing or living. Together with the certain internal dispositions, altruists do have a special way of seeing the things of the world. “Altruists simply have a different way of seeing things. Where the rest of us see a stranger, altruists see a fellow human being. While many disparate factors may contribute to the existence and development if what I identify as an altruistic perspective, it is the perspective itself that constitutes the heart of altruism”.[25] Our spur-of-the-moment responses tackled with unanticipated surroundings reproduce our deep-set dispositions and our grade of interior readiness.[26] We cannot reject the fact that altruism infuses our observances. It is articulated promptly when we are antagonized with the requirements of the other. Today moral philosophical way gives the only emphasis to what is right giving the least importance to the nature of valuable life. These views open our horizons to see it from a wider perspective and to cultivate altruism as a way of being of our lives. Historical understanding of the development of altruism will deepen our knowledge of altruism.

 

1.2 Glimpse of the philosophy of  altruism: the beginning and its historical  developments

The philosophy of altruism is a philosophy of other-centered love and concern with selfless motives. The comprehensive overview of the history of the philosophy of altruism is vital to do better something for the other in the world today.

 

1.2.1 Philosophy of altruism in the ancient philosophical perspectives and sacred stance

To understand the real meaning of altruism we have to understand the meaning of altruism in ancient philosophy and early traditions. Philosophy of altruism and morality can be called as the two sides of the same coin.[27] The basic moral questions began to be questioned from the ancient philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.[28] When Aristotle makes a discussion on friendship in his Nichomachean Ethics, there we see a glimpse of altruism.  Aristotle describes friendship as reciprocated goodwill, mainly a relationship between two people in which love and goodwill are shared where one wishes always for the goodness of one’s friend for their sake. [29] In the viewpoint of Aristotle, virtuous men always wish and have a tendency to act for the wellness of the other.[30] Here always emerge certain questions regarding our ends behind each moral act; whether it is for self or the other. In his philosophy, we humans sometimes seek the goodness of friends and other times goodness of oneself.

Self-centered behavior of oneself is named as an attribute of the bad human being.[31] But things are not so simple, because in acting in a way that is motivated by the interests of one’s friend is in a way that he is acting both for the friend’s sake and by an extension of one’s feeling, for oneself. In one way or in another way each one is in friendship with oneself and he spoke the difference between the self and others too, which is central to the moral philosophy today.  Aristotle’s opinion was that friends hold a mirror up to each other; through that mirror, they can see each other in ways that would not otherwise be accessible to them, and it is this reciprocal mirroring that helps them improve themselves as persons.[32] Friends, then, share a similar concept of eudaimonia and help each other achieve it. But he did not tell anything of one’s obligation towards the stranger. He just preferred true friendship as the best way to give services to others. When he illustrated the self-love, he sketched the discrepancies between self-love that is worthy and self-love that which promotes only self-gratification of oneself as unvirtuous.[33] When one acts for the betterment of one’s friend, he acquires virtuousness nature becomes a progressed human being.[34] Since altruism is always in concern of the centrality of self, always question emerges whether it is possible to act only for the welfare of the other. Concerning this question, Aristotle answers in his Eudemian Ethics; it is true to say of the man of good character that he performs many actions for the sake of his friends and his country and if necessary even dies for them. For he will sacrifice both money and honors and in general the goods that people struggle to obtain in pursuit of what is morally fine.[35] But here we can see that mere virtuous (altruistic) action doesn’t give any good to the friends. “Virtuous action is a rational moral action in pursuit of that which in addition to the good it does its beneficiaries (one’s friends), is also morally fine”.[36] Motives have a prior role in the philosophy of altruism.

The concept of the other was very familiar in the moral traditions of Judaism and Christianity.  Their dictum was ‘love your neighbor’ and it was an approach against selfishness and self-love (ego). In the Old Testament, we see a command against revenge, ‘love your neighbor as thyself’[37]; a commandment against coveting the property of the neighbor, ‘by coveting the properties of the neighbors, don’t give any false witness to our neighbors’.[38] Even the good manners of one to the other and necessity of the reciprocity are very well explained in Golden Rule which has its root in Talmud; “a certain heathen came to Shammai and said to him: ‘Make me a proselyte, on condition that you teach me the whole Torah while I stand on one foot’. Thereupon he repulsed him with the rod, which was in his hand. When he went to Hillel, he said to him, ‘what is hateful to you do not do to your neighbor: that is the whole Torah; all the rest of it is commentary; go and learn”.[39] The Golden Rule says; “do unto others as you would have them do unto you”[40]. Another version of it can be seen as follows;  “love one another as I have loved you. No one has greater love than this than to lay down one’s life for one’s friends”.[41] As we have seen in Aristotle, here there is an ultimate presentation of love in our actions towards the other. Altruistic acts in the Christian and Judeo tradition can be called as the expression of the love to God. The scripture provides divine paraphernalia to the philosophy of altruism. This type of approach is seen not only in Catholic and Judeo traditions but also in  Hinduism, Islamic traditions, Buddhist traditions, Jainism principles, etc. In Mahābhārata, we read the advice of Vidura to the King Yuddhiśhṭhira;

Listening to wise scriptures, austerity, sacrifice, respectful faith, social welfare, forgiveness, purity of intent, compassion, truth, and self-control—are the ten wealth of character (self). O king aim for these, may you be steadfast in these qualities. These are the basis of prosperity and rightful living. These are the highest attainable things. All worlds are balanced on dharma, dharma encompasses ways to prosperity as well. O King, dharma is the best quality to have, wealth the medium and desire (kāma) the lowest. Hence, (keeping these in mind), by self-control and by making dharma (right conduct) your main focus, treat others as you treat yourself.[42]

In Islamic teachings, especially in Hadith,[43] we read as follows; “A Bedouin came to the prophet, grabbed the stirrup of his camel and said: O the messenger of God! Teach me something to go to heaven with it. Prophet said: As you would have people do to you, do to them; and what you dislike to be done to you, don't do to them. Now let the stirrup go.  This maxim is enough for you; go and act in accordance with it”.[44] Buddhists and Jainists ahimsa and karma also have the same indications.[45] They always forbid harmless to all living beings as part of the prohibition of causing living beings to suffer, these religions exhort us to treat others with respect and compassion. In this positive and direct form of Golden Rule, we can say, it tells us to consider others as others one would like to be considered. In its negative and prohibitive for, one should not try to have conducted in the ways one would not like to be treated. In its emphatic and responsive form, we can say, what you wish upon others, you wish upon yourself too. Therefore we say, the shortest way to benevolence is Golden Rule. 

The elegant scholastic philosopher Thomas Aquinas excavated the virtuous concepts of ethics of Aristotle and added courage to the Christian principles of charity to be virtuous and to be happy.[46] Thomas Aquinas understands you should love your neighbor as yourself with the connotation that love for ourselves is the exemplar of love for others. Considering that the love with which a man loves himself in the form and root of friendship and quotes Aristotle that the origin of friendly relations with others lies in our relations to ourselves, he concluded that we are not bound to love others more than ourselves, but more than the private good we have to look for the public good.[47] The ultimate end of human life for Aquinas is eternal beatitude. There is no virtue without charity for Aquinas. He also had discussed the question of whether to do an act that endangers one’’s values. For him, the spontaneous is not praiseworthy. When there is a risk in doing more good, it's more virtuous. “The elements of risk and danger in virtuous action are components of that certain kind of altruistic action that is defined by sacrifice or by the need for the agent to give something up in performing the act. This action is, for Aquinas, directed ultimately towards the end of achieving divinity”.[48] The love of charity leads to God. Holy Spirit as the eternal power will give powers to all risks and fears of doing. But the motivation of all these acts is nothing but blissfulness or divinity.[49] In its motivational point of view, it may be criticized because Christianity does not understand altruism in the same way as we understand altruism today in its point. The highest motivational point of the philosophy of altruism is the well-being of the other or needy while the motivation of Christianity is the eternal reward.

 

1.2.2. Critical outline to Thomas Hobbes’ philosophy of altruism

Thomas Hobbes’ ethics was a moral gesture positioned on other-centered behavior because of human nature.  The presence of natural law as in Aquinas’ principles and scholastic school is crystal clear even in the philosophical ethics of Thomas Hobbes. All his philosophical principles had its roots in reason and intellect. For him,  there is nothing in the human mind that does not originally derive from sensory perception and which is not caused by material stimuli from the outside world.[50] He considers the human mind itself as part of the material world, and not as something of a radically different substance.  

Human beings are egoist beings and in the world, there are not transcendent normative orders. We, human beings have tried their level best to make their order to fulfill their psychological and biological natures. Since human beings are self-interested beings, their actions are motivated by the self-interestedness to fulfill their desires and end to necessity and survival.[51] For him, the nature of human beings is individualistic and they are originally free and equal with philosophers of natural law.[52] Since he held the notion of natural law, he believed in the freedom and supremacy of personal interests over the others’ interests too. For him, since there is no eternal and universally valid standard of good evil, one has to rationalize the personal inclinations of good and evil. Since the freedom of human beings has a chance for exploitation and competition, he proposed subjective preferences to recognize common interests through means-end reasoning. For him, all these things are for one’s security. Even when he outlined the lists of the law of nature, even the golden rule was placed as last of it.[53]  His intention behind proposing all these only to defend one’s own interests. His expression goes like this; ‘do, not that to another, which thou thinking unreasonable to be done by another to thy self’.[54] For him, to secure one’s interests are prior to interests for the other. Catholic golden rule is altruistic while Hume’s golden principles are altruistic. Since Hume gives prior concern for the protection of one’s own interests, his views are egoistic. We deduct it from his definition of the law of nature. The Law of nature is a rule according to which a person is forbidden to do anything that is self-destructive or removes their ability to preserve their own life.[55] Hume expresses ‘do not that to another’ while the Bible expresses ‘do unto others’.His understanding of the golden rule is merely for one’s survival or only to fulfill one’s ends. We can’t call golden rule as altruistic because it underlines only the mutual ethical necessity, nothing more than that. Many philosophers criticized Hume’s egoism because of its diversion from the Christian tradition.

 

1.2.2.1 Disparagement to Hobbes

Hobbes was criticized by many for his erroneous inference regarding the object of one’s own will as merely thinking for one’s fulfillment of the personal interests. He believed by focusing on the personal interests that justice, peace, fraternity all those things are unintentional emergence.[56] According to the critiques especially in the view of Cumberland, he failed to recognize the selfless act which is directed towards the good of the other.[57] Critiques emphasized the groundedness of morality in human rational abilities instead of emotional outcomes.[58] What we should discover the laws of nature is the birthplace of morality as rationality and not mere emotionality.[59] The views of Cumberland, Pufendorf, Wolff, and Kant had paved the way for the emergence of this type of thought pattern. Together with Cumberland, Pufendorf emphasized the necessity of social living by fulfilling the common duties towards the others.[60] According to him, we all human beings have a common kinship by which we desist ourselves from harming others, exchange mutual assistance, and benevolence to the betterment either with loss or without loss of our own priorities.[61] What they proposed was other-centredness rather than self-centeredness.

 

1.2.2.2 New approach proposed by Christian Wolff and Immanuel Kant

For Wolff, duty towards others has the same significance towards the duty towards oneself.[62] It depicts the Christian principle love others as oneself. All human beings have an obligation towards the needy but it should not endanger our own lives and restricted by the circumstances and capacity. Our obligations towards our lives cannot be opposed by our obligations towards the other.[63]   According to him, we all should owe the ethics of good Samaritan without having any failure to fulfilling our responsibilities towards our lives.[64] Even though he insisted on the love towards the needy, he claimed a need for unequal dispersal of this love too. ‘Works of love are called benefits, and accordingly, friends strive to benefit us. Because we are obligated to love all men like ourselves, we owe most love to those who benefit us. The love of the benefactor is called gratitude, and so we should be grateful to our benefactor’.[65] Duty towards the needy becomes an ought only the need of the needy stronger than the need of the giver. He says: in a strict sense, each person is obligated by the law of nature to instantiate perfection in his/her own life. Actions that tend toward perfection produce pleasure and actions that tend toward imperfection produce displeasure or pain.[66] To fulfill the needs of needy also are part of our way towards perfection.

As an attribute to Wolf’s philosophical gesture, Kant developed his idea of universal practical philosophy. What he tried was to discover the reason as the basis for morality as opposed to other particularities. He spoke of the two kinds of rational knowledge: material knowledge, which concerns some object, and formal knowledge, which pays no attention to differences between objects and is concerned only with the form of understanding and reason, and with the universal rules of thinking.[67] He did not look for the circumstances or situations but for him, the moral law was a general formula in all situations. He spoke of three natures of the moral law;   To consider an action moral, it must be done for the sake of morality,  ethical quality is defined based on its motives not based on effects, to consider an act as ethical, it must be taken out of our reverence to the moral law.[68] He called the fundamental moral universal principle as the categorical imperative.[69] He avoided the dependence on the empirical activities but the empirical gestures like feelings and desires are more common in today's altruistic philosophies. His categorical imperative stands as objections to treat other rational beings as mere means to our ends. That means rational beings are ends in themselves and they are the subjects and makers of all laws.[70] To benefit the other is named as our moral duty. He announced beneficence as categorical morality or universal principles which bind all rational beings.[71] For him, since we are rational beings, we are supposed to accept this universal principle; beneficence. Beneficence is rational while mon-beneficence is irrational. The basis for our morality should be freedom, it is giving the law to the will.[72] By accepting categorical imperative as a universal principle, it respects the autonomy. Freedom of the will can never be evaluated by experience, it is possible only by reason.[73] When Hume’s followers had emphasized sentiments,  What Kant tried was only to give a prior role to reason as the motive.

 

1.2.3 The new face of the philosophy of altruism in the views of David Hume and Adam Smith

The love for one’s neighbor of the Christian tradition encountered morals of sentiment on one hand and morals of reason on the other hand in the advance of empiricism. Non-metaphysical basis of the means-ends reasoning of Hobbes paved a way for the better comprehension of morality which led to altruistic morality.[74] During this time, a new thought pattern by emphasizing sentiments to make judgments of morality rather than reason.[75] They believed that morality should come out of feeling and emotions which showed a taste of altruistic philosophy. David Hume’s views are debited to Locke, Berkley, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson. He believed that sensation is the only way to know the world and the only basis to make moral judgments.[76] When he made discussion over the many forms of the virtues like sociability, good-naturedness, humaneness, mercifulness, gratitude, friendliness, generosity, and beneficence, he named beneficence with the clear meaning of altruism as the uppermost worth that humanity can achieve.[77] This sympathy that developed through one’s own familial and social relationships becomes a motivating factor to help the needy. For him, sympathy was a principle to handover feelings to the other.[78]  Emphasis given to emotion and sentiment rather than reason gave a new face to the progress of the philosophy of altruism.

 At the same time, Adam Smith, the contemporary of David Hume agreed to the egoism of Hobbes for the common good and only with the egoism or with the freedom of oneself, one can advance in their interest and have an economic gain and by which welfare of the society can be protected.[79] According to Smith, the egoism of Hobbes are to be overemphasized. Our natural prudence is to look after our interests. Since we are social beings, we, human beings have sympathy or empathy towards others; we feel with the distressed, the oppressed, and the happiness of the other people too because morality germinates from our social beingness.[80] For him, the foundation of the moral sense is sympathy.[81] For him, sympathy is a passion for the other.[82] Here one tries to place one in the position of the needy through the logic of mirroring.[83]  The logic of mirroring does not mean to act on imagination but to act on another’s perspective.

As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of how they are affected, but by conceiving what we should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is on the rack, as long as we are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can carry us beyond our person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to this any other way, than by representing to us what would be our own, if we were in his case? It is the impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy. By the imagination, we place ourselves in his situation.[84]

Many had criticized him for its possibility of practicability only in its proximity. But in reality, his principle of sympathy has a tone of the self-sacrifice and its not more love for our neighbor but his principle is with the involvement of reason-principle conscience and impartial observer perspectives.[85] Rational groundedness of morality was least bothered in their perspectives. For him, beneficence promotes social life by insisting on us to double the happiness of our neighbor who is in need.[86] We can’t demand it from anyone but it can be appreciated by all. Moderation of our passions and reining of our actions are done by self-command or with a self-conscience.[87] Even though we could not find the use of the term altruism in their principles, we could find benevolence and other-centeredness which had the tastiness of altruism.

 

 

1.2.4 The modern sense of altruism in the religion of humanity and social Darwinism

The modern meaning of altruism in the extreme sense began with Auguste Comte who coined altruism into the history of philosophy with the gist of benevolence and sympathy.[88]  What Comte had tried through this principle was the progress of social relationships instead of traditional responsibilities towards God and the community. In his thoughts, morality emerged by giving more importance to the interests of others than one’s own.  As I had mentioned earlier, altruism originated from a specific part of the brain.  As part of socialization, the presence of altruism with the sense of sympathy was claimed even in all other sentient beings too.[89] Ayn Rand presents altruism of Auguste Comte as follows;

Auguste Comte, the founder of Positivism, the champion of science, advocated a “rational,” “scientific” social system based on the total subjugation of the individual to the collective, including a “Religion of Humanity” which substituted Society for the Gods or gods who collect the blood of sacrificial victims. It is not astonishing that Comte was the coiner of the term Altruism, which means: the placing of others above self, of their interests above one’s own.[90]

Auguste Comte wanted to make a new religion of the great humanity or the beings and defined it as Vivre pour autrui. Comte had defined altruism as follows;

The individual must subordinate himself to an Existence outside himself in order to find in it the source of his stability. And this condition cannot be effectually realized except under the impulse of propensities prompting him to live for others. The being, whether man or animal, who loves nothing outside himself, and really lives for himself alone, is by that very fact condemned to spend his life in a miserable alternation of ignoble torpor and uncontrolled excitement. The principal feature of Progress in all living things is that the general consensus which we have seen to be the essential attribute of vitality should become more perfect. It follows that happiness and worth, as well in individuals as in societies, depend on adequate ascendancy of the sympathetic instincts. Thus the expression, Live for Others, is the simplest summary of the whole moral code of Positivism.[91]

For him, the altruistic principles control the family functions and even the civic. The altruistic principles in the brain take the initiative to regulate and weaken the egoistic principles even though egoistic principles are necessary for their survival.[92] Since we are egoistic, it’s a difficult task. Thoughts developed by Comte to support his views are complex. The sovereignty of our instinct to be self-preservative or egoistic is forfeited to higher signs of progress of our reason. For him, it generates a ‘fatal separation’ between heart and mind that impends the unity of man.[93] If we try only to promote altruism by separating it from egoism it would be a disastrous endeavor, unless it had stretched the mandatory phase of advance.[94] If not, we can’t distinguish untainted altruism from altruism that aided to encourage the self-centeredness of others.[95] Even though altruism takes its first step in family, the gradual expansion of it happens with education and continued cooperation between intellect and altruistic feelings which look for the renovation of the civilization of social life by giving prior aptitude and attitude to the other-centered and other-interested tendencies instead of self-centered acts with the view of building up social affairs.[96]  Comte calls it as follows; “the ultimate systematization of human life must consist above all in the development of altruism”.[97] When he proposed a religion of humanity, he proposed rejection of individual rights if they are opposed to social duties and he wanted to train everyone in altruism and what he did was the exaltation of the emotions over the intellect.[98]

Ultimately, Comte thought, a spontaneous, natural, innate altruism[99] would come about, as human beings, through the evolution of thought, were able to assert the superiority of intellect over emotion, and altruism over egoism in their inclinations. This development is, according to Comte, ‘less easy to realize than the egotistical unity’, because of the effort required by the intellect and is, therefore, once arrived at, ‘superior to wealth and stability’[100] in making human social relationships secure. He called out for the subordination of self-love to the needs of the others. According to him, it protects both individuals and society. If altruism does not work in collaboration with human rationality it won't get succeded. Mere rationality may lead to one’s arrogance or vanity but with social responsibilities, it can be used to do the best to the needy.[101]  According to him, rationality has to encounter the need of society and it makes the best discernment to do them the best act.[102] For him, Evolved altruistic principles would guide the universal moral principles.

 Herbert’s interests in Social Darwinism paved for his interests in altruism the same as Comte. By believing in the theory of natural selection of Darwin, he said, in the evolutionary process, altruism would be there in the evolution of the moral betterment of human beings.[103] Even though his thoughts had the taste of Comte, he was not radical and he even gave a prior emphasis to egoism above altruism. For him, the supremacy of egoism above altruism is imperative and peremptory because, in a long life, we give importance to ourselves than others.[104] His definition of altruism is simply an action that benefits others than oneself.[105] What he preferred was a restricted egoism. According to him, clean altruism or egoism is harmful to the world. The commitment to self-sacrifice, which altruism involved, is incompatible with Spencer’s commitment to the survival of the fittest in his evolutionary theory.[106] Altruism becomes outdated because the wants of the individual are most entirely comprehended in a society where egocentricity accords with the interests of all. It leads to taking pleasure in others’ cheerfulness.[107] What Spencer wanted to be a reconciliation of egoism and altruism in the human evolutionary processes.

 Nietzsche disparaged Spencer’s social Darwinistic altruism by telling that he could not find any relation between altruism and human development. What he could find is only an individual. His critical approaches to morality are seen in his resentment thesis.[108] According to him, altruism can be another status of one’s psychological weakness and he defined it as the most hypocritical form of egoism grounded in resentment of others’ success.[109] For him, ones’ low worthiness is made use by the individual of altruism to calculate the worth of others’ doings.[110] He criticized Spencer’s altruism because it removed the self at the expense of an obsession with the other. For him, the reason for altruism has lacked the experience of love.[111] Those who lack love, try to build an ideal world where they can experience this love. For him, it is a pursuit of two loves of the unegoistic ones who wish themselves to be emptied to serve their purposes.[112] For him, only because of pity, human beings think of others and do something for the suffered.[113] Our acts to reduce others’ sufferings may be an insentient reproduction of what our sufferings are. To relieve our pity we do good deeds.[114] He criticized everything that gave more importance to others than oneself. Marx Scheler opposed Nietzsche's view by telling that one loves the other not out of weakness but because of positive values.[115] Altruists end up fleeing from the fear of self and view themselves as less worthy.[116] This is because, according to Scheler, altruism cannot answer the question: why am I or why will I not be worthy of the positive value of love from the other?[117]  According to him, there is a place for the value of reciprocity. Max Scheler spoke of two realms where one helps the needy;  out of an expression of love motivated by a powerful feeling of security, strength, and inner salvation, of the invincible fullness of one’s own life and existence; out of certain modern alternatives for love, ... nothing but the urge to turn away from oneself and to lose oneself in other people’s business.[118] He continued to say, "love for the small, the poor, the weak, and the oppressed is really disguised hatred, repressed envy, an impulse to detract, etc., directed against the opposite phenomena: wealth, strength, power, largesse”.[119] Through the evolutionary thoughts, altruism began to give special concern for the animal behavior without considering its motivations and to keep away from the self-sacrificial concern to merely considering others’ concern as one’s own. By emphasizing either emotion or reason as motives,  much different understanding of altruism developed throughout history.

 

1.3 Rationale and principles of the philosophy of altruism

Whenever we consider the philosophy of altruism we should consider whether the action is motivated by reason or emotion. Based on its motives we decide whether it's altruistic or not in moral philosophy. Emotion is instinctive or intuitive feeling while reason means the power of the mind to think, understand, and form judgments logically.

 

1.3.1 Categorical imperative as the motive

In the understanding of duty, Kant made the distinction between the "I want" (self-interest) and the "I ought" (ethics).[120] For him, ethical actions are not a spontaneous one. When one is needed, therefore we look for some way to help the needy. An act that comes out of duty can be named as two; actions that sprout out of the sense of duty and action in conformity with duty.[121] Our actions towards the needy are our duty towards the needy. When he spoke of the imperatives in the duties, he spoke of hypothetical and categorical imperatives.[122] For him, hypothetical imperatives with the nature of conditioned are guided by our self-interests or our desires while categorical imperatives are with the nature of universality and unconditioned.[123] Kant made three formulations of the categorical imperatives; the formula of universal law[124], formula of humanity[125] and formula of autonomy.[126] He explained four Kinds of Duties: Duties Toward Oneself (Perfect: Self-Preservation, Imperfect: Self-Cultivation) and Duties Toward Others (Perfect: Strict Obligation, Imperfect: Beneficence).[127] Actions without inclinations are perfect and actions with inclinations are imperfect.[128] All his concepts of duties towards others should be guided by reason.

According to Kant, motivated by reason reflects the acceptance of categorical imperative as the binding force of one’s action. When one acts according to this maxim, it becomes a universal law.[129] A maxim is a pithy statement expressing a general truth or rule of conduct. Without having a moral reason to act, we should not make the action.[130] For him, rational knowledge is knowledge from principles or knowledge of the particular in the universal or faculty of principles.[131]

Kant claims the duty of everyone to be beneficent. That means helping others without hoping for personal gains. He portrayed a difference between beneficence and benevolence too. He considered benevolence done from friendly leaning as unlimited whereas beneficence from duty does not place unlimited demands on persons.[132] For him, beneficence is doing good while benevolence as wishing good. Benevolence becomes beneficence in the applied love of humans.[133] The beneficient concept is an obligation for him. A benevolent individual receipts gratification in the happiness of others and he defined beneficence as ‘the maxim of making other’s happiness one’s end’.[134] His concept of beneficence gives his clear view of altruism. But the limits our duties should hold are not clear in Kant’s view. He did not explain how far our obligations should extend. According to one’s capacities, we should fulfill our duty to be beneficent but we don’t have an unlimited duty to do it. The reason should guide us to recognize what our obligations are. He also argued for the impossibility of having universal non-beneficence as a law.[135]

Human beings are not meant for living in isolation. We are social beings and we need support and help from each other and altruism can be claimed as the best component for this human nature. Kant says we as human beings are always in a psychological tension between seclusions and sociability.[136] When we are pushed into society, we look for seclusions or solitudes and when we are in solitudes or seclusions, we look for sociability. Altruism can be developed as a response to this psychological tension because human beings are needy beings even though we prefer liberty from the other.[137] His concept of the duty of beneficence has two characteristics; imperfect and meritorious.[138] By imperfect, Kant meant that there are no stringent positions to be altruistic, some times certain other apprehensions may override the necessity to be altruistic.[139] By meritorious, Kant meant that no one can blame ethically the one who flops to do the act.[140] Our situations or our surroundings may influence how our altruistic acts are. To make an act, we should make a choice. This choice should be done only under reason. For him, the reason is not a mere theoretic gesture but a practical indicative.[141] Even though emotions have a particular influence on our acts, reason as motive overrides our wants and desires. In Kantian ethics, reason becomes the motivator of our altruistic act. For him, altruistic acts are preferable virtuous act but he did not support reason as a compelling motivator for the act.[142] For him, “reason necessarily makes what belongs to mere appearance subordinate to the character of the thing in itself”.[143] To have our lives in the world of non-beneficence, therefore, can be named to make an act contrary to reason. His concept of duty of altruism should stem from reason than mere immediate responses that emerged out of mere emotions.

 

1.3.2 Sentiment as a motivating factor

As  I had explained earlier, Adam Smith and David Hume emphasized sentiment as a motivating factor to altruism. They emphasized sympathy, empathy, compassion, tenderness, softheartedness as a motivating factor for the altruistic acts. Hume takes the view that morality depends on ‘Some sense or feeling which nature has made universal in the whole species’.[144] As I presented, Kant did not accept these views. He considered emotions as changeable, transitory and we can’t depend on those emotions. Therefore, moral judgments needed abstractions from emotion and feelings. For centuries, it was assumed that all human behavior, including the helping of others, is egoistically motivated. The term egoism refers to a motivational state in which the goal is to increase one’s welfare as an end in itself.[145] Lawrence Blum criticized Kantian dependence only on the reason for the altruistic acts. He says;

Specifically, Kant’s position as consisting of three aims. First, according to Blum, Kant wishes to articulate a single fundamental principle of morality that applies to all human beings – this is his categorical imperative. Second, Kant believes that our common human reason applied to moral knowledge must yield no internal tensions or contradictions as otherwise, it would not give us a principled approach to morality. Finally, Blum interprets Kant’s position as strict and categorical: moral obligation is unconditionally binding, on all people, and at all times, just because it is the right thing to do. These three aspects do not fit well with how altruism or indeed morality is actually encountered in the world in which we live.[146]

Sentiment as a motivating factor of altruism always makes actions according to inclinations and desires.[147] Their inclination is to promote the good of the other. It is egoistic too because here their inclination looks for the wellbeing of the needy.[148] It means to feel for the other. Affective perception or the cognitive imagination of the needy’s experience has its place in emotions as a motivating factor of altruism. [149]By this motive, we enter into the resonance with the other. We can have two types of resonances here; convergent and divergent resonances. Convergent resonance means identical – I suffer when you suffer.[150] Divergent resonance means reactive – instead of showing the same feeling we keep a distance but at the same time we show a particular concern.[151] By having emotion as the motive, one feels an affinity with the suffered and one understands the difficulties of the one who feels and thereby emerges sympathy, empathy, and compassion towards the needy.[152] When one has emotion as the motive for the altruism,  one tries to know the internal state of the person who suffers, generate emotional resonance, make a neutral mimicry, try to intuit or project oneself into another’s situation, imagine how another is thinking and feeling, imagine how one would think and feel in other’s place, feel empathic distress and finally thereby emerge empathic concern for the other.[153] This view assigns a sophisticated cognitive role to the altruistic emotions through their capacity to recognize others as needy and to assess the nature of their needs.[154] But I feel that it is hard to square these more reason-based roles with the interpretation of emotions as instincts. The followers of this view say that there are many types of goodness and why we should try to connect into a unitary principle.  They believed that we do not need a reason as the foundation that we need is the only sentiment as the motive.[155]  The supporters of this view emphasized conduct motived by one’s immediate emotional reactions to specific situations. For them, altruism is a special type of emotion to help the downtrodden. They believe that emotion as sufficient and necessary to engender an altruistic motivation.[156]  Both the followers of reason and emotion as the motivating factor of altruism are so rigid to their views.

 

1.3.3 The principle of reciprocity

Reciprocity comes from the Latin word reciprocus with the meaning going back and forth (retro-procus) – giving and taking. [157]The actual meaning of it is a mutual exchange and not logically equal to the notion of giving and take. It is a standard of moral action with the characteristic of social interaction.[158] The foundation of reciprocity is nothing but the thought that humans are social beings with the capacity to give and take the benefits.[159] The ideal altruism emphasizes giving no anticipation of future rewards while reciprocal altruism accentuates the giving with the limited expectation of or potential for the expectation of future rewards.[160] Even though altruism impulses us to benefit others, its nature is unconditional as holding a difference in itself to reciprocity.  When we think of helping the needy,  the principle of reciprocity prompts us to believe that, if their giving is not returned, they are exploited. Thus echo on justice, equality, and fairness of treatment instructs us to examine reciprocity as we consider altruism.[161] Marx Scheler did not understand the meaning of the idea of reciprocity.[162] He believed only in the unconditional concepts of altruism. For Nietzsche,  altruism was an unacceptable martyrdom [163]because by giving more importance to the needs of the other more than ours can be called as a utopian view and it destroyed the giver itself.

Our traditions believe human beings still exist only because of reciprocity. Our survival is only because of our ancestor's shared goods and services on the web of obligation. It can be called a web of indebtedness with an adaptive mechanism for the survival of society.[164] There can be positive and negative reciprocity too. Positive reciprocal altruism is defined as the returning of the action with the same positive effects one has given.[165] In the philosophy of altruism, negative reciprocity is defined as an attempt to get something for nothing.[166] The golden rule concepts of our ancient traditions go in hand with the principle of reciprocity with the mutuality of our obligations. When Kant explained the principle of beneficence, he emphasized reciprocation as its rationale.[167] Kant argues that one has a duty to be beneficent because it would be irrational to forgo the possible help one might need from others in the future.[168] Kant emphasized the duty of mutual aid with human beings' acknowledgment of their duties.[169] Regan emphasized the necessity of intensions behind our acts.[170] According to him, our helping and hurting depend on the alternatives available to the decision making and if we do our acts only to get the rewards its not reciprocal altruism.[171]Therefore he called for reciprocal fairness – one gets only something as in the return of one’s fairness in the act and not merely with the motive of rewards.[172] Scott says the philosophy of altruism may accept reciprocation even though it does not demand it.[173] He spoke of two types of reciprocity in the philosophy of altruism.

First kind of reciprocity that depends on conditions of reasonable exchange, and reciprocity that is by contrast incidental to the giving act. In the first case, a company might, for example, agree to give money to a charity as long as the charity puts the company’s logo on all its future promotions as ‘free’ advertising which doubts on the altruistic motivations of the company. With the second kind of reciprocity, it would seem to be only fair that if a person has benefited from another’s the selfless act of giving, they ought to do something in return, regardless of whether it is expected of them.[174]

Reciprocation seems good in altruism but it is not demandable. Freedom should be given to the one who receives help. Some times our indebtedness to the giver may harm the voluntary nature of altruism. It is good to have a reciprocal act with gratitude and kind but it should not be made as obligatory. For the survival of humans, the principle of reciprocity should be appreciated in the philosophy of altruism.

 

1.3.4 The principle of impartiality

Impartiality in the philosophy of altruism means to treat every being to do justice to all on earth with equal respect and worth in unbiased and unprejudiced with proper reasons.[175] R. Dworkin considers reasoning impartially as a type of abstinence from our preferences and prejudices and to take into consideration only the circumstances of the situation with the impartial mind set up.[176] He made a distinction between equality in being treated and the reception of the equal treatment. For him, being treated as a necessary requisite for impartiality and reception of equal treatment is not as necessary as being treated as an equal in the principle of impartiality.[177] He emphasized the adoption of priorities like a good reason for this. The principle of impartiality in altruism can be called as seeing everything in the viewpoint of God because God is impartial according to Christianity.[178] Buddhism even had called impartiality as one of the seven factors to attain enlightenment and one of the four sublime status for the rebirth.[179] For Hinduism, it is one of the thirteen kinds of truth.[180] To do justice to the world or to the needy, impartiality claimes to be an essential factor.

According to Brad Hooker, there are three points to calculate moral impartiality. “First, one may ask whether moral rules are being impartially applied. Second, impartial benevolence may be used as a direct guide to practical decisions. And third, the content of first-order moral rules may be assessed from an impartial standpoint”.[181] The universal applicable principles of Kantian deontological theories by placing rationality to the universal point of view and by treating human beings as ends in itself instead of means supported the impartial moral reasoning.[182] The principle of impartiality counts the interests of all equally and even personal sacrifices can be made for the fulfillment of overall interest satisfaction and maximization.[183] Peter Singer with a negative consequentialist mentality spoke much of impartiality with the concept of relatedness and nearness[184] that I  will explain in the coming chapter.  The impartialists either deny the existence of morally admirable partiality or holds impartiality as a pervasive universal requirement of morality. The principle of impartiality is constructed through the ideal observer[185] too which portrays an agent or person to make moral judgments without being influenced by any biased or prejudiced mind to see everything from a particular point of view but this view was criticized because of the observer’s distant from the actual situation. The ideal observer was considered as the one who makes the proper judgment or one who always does the right.[186] To do all our acts with impartiality is always a question. When we choose to aid our family members and dear ones, impartiality becomes always doubtful. To answer this question we may have to see everything from the impersonal point of view that means seeing everyone as persons. Our near ones and dear ones also will be considered as persons with equal truthfulness with others.[187] There is another way of seeing it by looking into the classification of moral principles as first-order moral principles and second-order moral principles. According to this distinction, impartiality belongs only to the second-order morality.[188] First order-morality always includes ordinary choices or decisions with certain partiality. It also may give space for the interests of the near and dear ones.[189] Second-order principles should be always in accordance with the principles of justice and institutional rules.[190] But this type of moral action may be a coercive morality.

 We can define therefore impartiality in the philosophy of altruism as follows; “impartiality, as an obligation of justice, may be said to mean, being exclusively influenced by the considerations which it is supposed ought to influence the particular case in hand, and resisting the solicitation of any motives which prompt to conduct different from what those considerations would dictate”.[191] With the ideal observative point of view and impersonal point of view, the principle of impartiality has its own significance in the philosophy of altruism.

 

1.3.5 The principle of supererogation

Supererogatory acts are those beyond the call of duty or beyond what is morally required of us and actions which go the extra mile and are praiseworthy on just that account.[192] The word supererogation comes from the Latin word “supererogatio with the meaning of payment beyond what is needed or asked. This emerges from super "beyond" and erogare "to pay out, expend", itself from ex "out" and rogare "to ask". It is the performance of more than is asked for; the action of doing more than duty requires”.[193] It means to know how much one is obliged to do and go beyond it. Here the oughtness includes a can. The failure of these supererogatory acts is not blamed. In the catholic tradition, supererogatory acts are considered as a gesture for individual salvation and salvation of others. Thomas Aquinas spoke of the two merits of the principle of supererogation. On the one hand, supererogation serves as a more expedient or guaranteed way of achieving everlasting life; on the other, it is intrinsically good in being aimed at higher ends than the mere fulfillment of the commandments.[194] He gave importance to the morality of love than strict laws. [195]He did not make any difference between duty and supererogation. Therefore it may obtain a meaning beyond the line of law. The doers of supererogation are called as saints and heroes.  Urmson defined supererogation as “actions that are morally praiseworthy, valuable, although not obligatory in the sense that their omission is not blameworthy”.[196]This definition tells us that it is not morally required but good to have it. We are under no moral obligation to do such acts but it’s an act of Good Samaritan – give what is necessary to the needy. This principle of supererogation goes beyond duty and doing good as much as possible.

There are three views related to supererogation. The first of them is Anti-supererogation. It argues for the obligations of the morally good action and the wrongness of its omission. According to anti-supererogation, there exists a “good-ought tie-up”.[197] Doing best is always obligatory and it can never be optional. Therefore, supererogation is impossible for them. Even though Kantian beneficence spoke of the unwantedness of unnecessary blames to the one who does not do the supererogatory act, his concept has a negative tone to supererogation too.[198] ‘Kantian ethics is based on the general idea of an all-encompassing moral law and conceives of duty as the only expression of moral value in human action. Universalizability of the maxim of action and acting from the sense of duty (or respect for the law) as a motive are two constitutive hallmarks of moral action according to Kant. But the two are incompatible with the nature of supererogatory action, which is optional and personal on the one hand and not motivated by the subjection to the moral law on the other’.[199] Classical utilitarianism also denied supererogation because the fundamental end of every action is to promote the overall good. It should be an obligation and should not be optional.

The second one is the Qualified supererogation. It emphasizes the fact that “there are actions which lie beyond the call of duty, but their value is derived from their being hypothetical duties, subjective duties, duties from which one may be excused, that is, duties in a weaker sense”.[200] They considered supererogation as moral action with qualified sense and as a moral requirement. But at the same time, they believed it’s not meant for all because they try to use the principle of excuse.[201] In this concept, they talk of supererogation with the reason for action.[202] Each action may have a reason and at the same time, there will be the second-order reason not to act that one. This permission may be named as exclusionary.[203] But this view failed to give what actually meritorious supererogation is.

The third one is unqualified supererogation.[204] This view underlines the fact that supererogatory actions are without qualification beyond the requirements of morality and that is the basis of their unique value. [205]The principle of supererogation is called the higher flights of morality and morality of aspiration because of its freedom, choice, beyondness of one’s responsibility ad obligations.[206]   Going beyond one’s duty points to the free choice. It means it's not commanded, demanded and imposed. They believe supererogation as the best because of liberty with which one performs. Since it is optional,  for the omission of an act, one does not find any excuse or doesn't need to get permission. Therefore supererogation is a personal and spontaneous act with liberty.[207]  The presence of supererogation in the philosophy of altruism doubles its effectiveness and goodness in the world.

 

1.4 Conclusion

What I tried all through this chapter was to present the basic understandings of the philosophy of altruism. Even the philosophy of altruism seems like a simple, it's understandings ae somewhat complex. Philosophy of altruism is a practical philosophy with the intention of the betterment of others. The philosophy of altruism claims itself to be an unconditional philosophy of love and kindness which provides helps to all who are in need and achieve a type of satisfaction by helping others and by promoting the interests of the other. Religious philosophies of Christianity, Buddhism, Jainism, Judaism, Islam propagate the philosophy of altruism through their concepts Golden Rule. Aristotle, Aquinas, Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Adam Smith, Nietzsche, Kant,  Marx Scheler, John Stuart Mill, Peter Singer have their way of defining and proposing concepts related to altruism but they all aim only one thing, the goodness of the other and the needy. Since we are human beings, we all find a conflict between egoism and altruism. The principle of impartiality, impersonality, reciprocity, supererogation call for the betterment or wellbeing of the other in the philosophy of altruism. Even though there are views regarding the motivations behind the moral act of altruism with emotions and reason, they both emphasized the betterment of the other. The otherness is respected very well in the philosophy of altruism. Whatever be the motivations behind each altruistic acts, all prefer to reduce the suffering of all. Philosophy of altruism shows a theorem with a pragma for the other even with the self-emptying nature. Therefore, all the concepts, principles and historical nurture of philosophy of altruism tell to the world, to be an altruistic philosopher means to be selfless for the well-being of the other.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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[1] Cf. A. COMTE, System of Positive Politics I (Paris² 1851)  680. 

[2] Cf. ibid., 692.

[3] Cf. ibid., 694.

[4] The instincts are sorted according to the dual rule of decreasing energy and increasing social importance. For example, the first instinct, the instinct of nutrition, is the most energetic one, since nutrition is an absolute necessity, but it is less important in term of morality; the opposite applies to kindness or the love of humanity, the tenth instinct, which is morally the most important, but the least energetic. Comte sorts these ten instincts into three categories. Five instincts (nutrition, sex, maternal, military or destructive, and industrial or constructive) make up interest or pure egoism; then two intermediate tendencies (domination and approbation) are egoistic, but require social relations in order to satisfy the human drive toward ambition; and, finally, there come three pure altruistic instincts (attachment, veneration and kindness).

[5] Cf. ibid., 700.

[6] Ibid., 693. .

[7] Ibid., 694.

[8] Cf. M. RICARD, Atruism ( London 2016) 5.

[9] H. SPENCER, Data of Ethics (London 1879) 232.

[10] Cf. ibid., 233.

[11] Cf. ibid., 235.

[12] In the first stage, one gets one’s share, or one’s share in respect of egoism; then contracts bind those providing the various means; then market contracts are to be respected – maintaining, through supply and demand, a due adjustment of the advantages and the labour given, developing within industrial society. These two intermediary stages entail the decline of direct and indirect aggression, engendering the final stage, characterized by an increase of sympathy leading to exchange of services beyond agreement.

[13] H. SPENCER, Data of Ethics, 276.

[14] Cf. ibid., 277.

[15] Cf. ibid., 278.

[16] Cf. T. NAGEL, The Possibility of Altruism ( Princeton 1978) 79.

[17] Cf. S. G. POST, Unlimited Love: Altruism, Compassion and Service (Oxford  2003)  vi.

[18] Cf. C. D. BASTON, Altruism in Humans (Oxford 2011) 21.

[19] Cf. K. R. MONROE, The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of Common Humanity ( Cambridge 1996) 6.

[20] Cf. ibid., 7.

[21] Cf. M. RICARD, Atruism, 19.

[22] Cf. C. D. BASTON, Altruism in Humans, 22.

[23] Cf. Ibid., 26.

[24] Cf. F. HUTCHESON, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, With Illustrations on the Moral Sense (Oxford 2007) 207.

[25] K.R.MONROE, The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of a Common Humanity,19.

[26] Cf. M. RICARD, Atruism, 21.

[27] Cf. ibid., 22.

[28] Cf. ibid., 24.

[29] Cf. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J. A. K.THOMPSON (London³ 1976) 1155b-24.

[30] Cf.ibid.

[31] Cf. ibid., 1166b-30.

[32] Cf. ibid., 1158a-10.

[33] Cf. M. PAKALUK,  “Friendship”, in: Blackwell Companion of Philosophy, A Companion of Aristotle,  ed. G. ANAGNOSSTOPOLOUS (London 2009) 135.

[34] Cf. ibid., 136.

[35] Cf. ARISTOTLE, Eudemian Ethics, trans. M. WOODS (Oxfrod³ 2005) 1217a-1218b.

[36] N. SCOTT - J. SEGLOW, Altruism (New York 2007) 6.

[37] Cf. Leviticus, 19,18; Tobit 4,15; Sirach 31,15.

[38] Cf. Exodus, 20, 16-17.

[39] Talmud, Shabbat 31a.

[40] Mathew 7, 12; Luke 6, 31

[41] John 15, 12-13.

[42] Mahābhārata Shānti-Parva 167:9

[43] The collected oral and written accounts of Muhammad and his teachings during his lifetime.

[44]  E. HOMERIN, “Kitab al-Kafi”, in: NEUSNER AND JACOB(eds.), The Golden Rule: The Ethics of Reciprocity in World Religions ( London 2008) 146.

[45] Cf. H. J. GENSLER, Ethics and the Golden Rule  (London 2013) 84.

[46] Cf. T. AQUINAS, Summa Theologica II-II, q.  25, a. 5, trans.  Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Texas² 1981)  4473.

[47] Cf. ibid., q.  25, a. 6, 4474.

[48] N. SCOTT - J. SEGLOW, Altruism, 10.

[49] Cf. T. AQUINAS, Summa Theologica II-II, q.  65, a. 2, 5035.

[50] Cf. C. W. MARIS, Critique of the Emphiricist Explanation of Morality  (London 1961) 24-25.

 

[51] Cf. N. SCOTT - J. SEGLOW, Altruism, 12.

[52] Cf. ibid., 13.

[53] Cf. T. HOBBES, Leviathan, trans. R. HAY (London² 1651) 88.

[54] Cf. ibid., 90. 

[55] Cf. ibid., 91.

[56] Cf. C.W. MARIS, Critique of the Empiricist Explanation of Morality, 28.

[57] Cf. N. SCOTT - J. SEGLOW, Altruism, 14.

[58] Cf. R. CUMBERLAND,  A Treatise of the Laws of Nature (Indiana 2013) 399-402.

[59] Cf. ibid., 403.

[60] Cf. S. PUFENDORF, On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law,trans. J. TULLYED - M. SILVERTHOME (Cambridge 1991) 234. 

[61] Cf. ibid., 235.

[62] Cf. G. GAVA, “Kant, Wolff, and the Method of Philosophy”, in:  D. GARBER - D. RUTHERFORD(eds.), Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Volume VIII (Oxford 2018) 272. These views are actually referred to Philosophia Practica Universalis of Christain Wolff.

[63] Cf. Ibid., 274.  

[64] Cf. ibid., 275.

[65] Cf. ibid.

[66] Cf.ibid., 278.

[67] Cf. I. Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. J. BENNETT (London² 2017)  1.

[68] Cf. ibid., 4.

[69] Cf. ibid., 14.

[70] Cf. ibid., 18.

[71] Cf. ibid., 23.

[72] Cf. ibid., 31.

[73] Cf. ibid., 44.

[74]  Cf. N. SCOTT - J. SEGLOW, Altruism, 15.

[75] Cf. ibid., 16.

[76] Cf. D. HUME, A Treatise on Human Nature , ed. L.A. SELBY BIGGE  (Oxford² 1896)  240.

[77] Cf. ibid., 243.

[78] Cf. ibid., 245.

[79] Cf. A. SMITH, The Theory of Moral Sentiments , ed. J. BENNETT (London²  2017) 2.

[80] Cf. ibid., 3.

[81] Cf. ibid.

[82] Cf. ibid., 10.

[83] Cf. ibid., 12.

[84]  Ibid., 15.

[85] Cf. ibid., 16.

[86] Cf. ibid., 30.

[87] Cf. ibid., 35.

[88] Cf. A. COMTE, System of Positive Politics I, 698.

[89] Cf. ibid., 700.

[90] R. L. CAMPBELL, “Altruism in Auguste Comte and Ayn Rand”: The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 7, no. 2 (Spring 2006) 359.

[91] A. COMTE, System of Positive Politics I, 565-566.

[92] Cf. ibid., 701.

[93] Cf.ibid.,704.

[94] Cf. ibid., 705.

[95] Cf. N. SCOTT - J. SEGLOW, Altruism, 17.

[96] Cf. ibid., 18.

[97] A. COMTE, System of Positive Politics IV, 253.

[98] Cf. ibid., 254.

[99] Cf. A. COMTE, System of Positive Politics III, 589 .

[100] A. COMTE, Cathechisme Positive I (Paris² 1853) 204.

[101]  Cf. Ibid., 205.

[102] Cf. ibid., 208.

[103] Cf. H. SPENCER, Data of Ethics, 169.

[104] Cf. ibid., 181.

[105] Cf. ibid., 185.

[106] Cf. ibid., 188.

[107] Cf. Ibid., 200.

[108] Cf. F. NIETZSCHE, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. C. DIETHEW (Cambridge² 2006) 18.

[109] Cf. ibid., 64.

[110] Cf. ibid., 66.

[111] Cf. F. NIETZCHE, Daybreak: Thoughts on the prejudies of morality, trans. R. J. HOLLINGDALE (Cambridge² 1982) 147.

[112] Cf. ibid., 148.

[113] Cf. ibid., 149.

[114] Cf. ibid., 150.

[115] Cf. M. Scheler,  Ressentiment , trans. L.  A. COSER (Cambridge² 1971) 88-89.

[116] Cf., ibid.,94-95.

[117] Cf. N. SCOTT - J. SEGLOW, Altruism, 20.

[118] Cf. M. Scheler,  Ressentiment, 95.

[119] Ibid., 96.

[120] Cf. I. Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 4.

[121] Cf. ibid., 19.

[122] Cf. ibid.

[123] Cf. ibid.

[124] Act as if the maxim of your actions were to secure through your will a universal law of nature. Cf. ibid., 30.

[125] Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of another, always as an end and never as means only. In essence, every person has intrinsic valueand the humanity is a limit or constraint on our action. Cf. ibid., 32.

[126] Every rational being must act as if he were through his maxim always a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends. In other words , we have to will what is consistent with the operations of the kingdom as a whole. In sum, both persons should consider themselves as both members and heads. Cf. ibid., 36.

[127] Cf. ibid., 21.

[128] Cf. ibid., 23.

[129] Cf. ibid.

[130] Cf. ibid., 25.

[131] Cf. ibid.

[132] Cf. ibid., 27.

[133] Cf. ibid., 28.

[134] Cf. ibid., 31.

[135] Cf. ibid., 33.

[136] Cf. ibid., 41.

[137] Cf. ibid., 43.

[138] Cf. ibid., 44.

[139] Cf. ibid., 46.

[140] Cf. ibid., 47.

[141] Cf. ibid.

[142] Cf. ibid., 48.

[143] Cf. ibid., 51.

[144] Cf. D. HUME, Inquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals (Oxford² 1975) 173.

[145] Cf. M. RICARD, Atruism, 45.

[146] L. BLUM, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (London 1980) 87

[147] Cf. N. SCOTT - J. SEGLOW, Altruism, 22.

[148] Cf. ibid., 25.

[149] Cf. M. RICARD, Atruism, 46.

[150] Cf ibid.

[151] Cf .ibid., 47.

[152] Cf. N. SCOTT - J. SEGLOW, Altruism, 25.

[153] Cf. M. RICARD, Atruism, 47.

[154] Cf .ibid., 48.

[155] Cf. N. SCOTT - J. SEGLOW, Altruism, 25.

[156] Cf. M. RICARD, Atruism, 47.

[157] Cf. M. RIDLEY, The Origins of Virtue (London 1997) 55.

[158] Cf. ibid., 57.

[159] Cf. R. B. CAIALDINI - M. SCHALLER, "Empathy-based helping: Is it selflessly or selfishly motivated?": Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (1987) 52 (4): 751.

[160] Cf. ibid., 754.

[161] Cf. M. RIDLEY, The Origins of Virtue, 61.

[162] Cf. M. Scheler,  Ressentiment, 90.

[163] Cf. F. NIETZCHE, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudies of Morality, 148.

[164] Cf. M. RIDLEY, The Orgins of Virtue, 59.

[165] Cf. M. RICARD, Atruism, 55.

[166] Cf. ibid

[167] Cf. I. Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 58.

[168] Cf. ibid., 61.

[169] Cf. ibid., 65.

[170] Cf. D.T. REGAN, "Effects of a favor and liking on compliance": Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (1971) 7 (6): 627.

[171] Cf. ibid., 629.

[172] Cf. ibid., 630.

[173] Cf. N. SCOTT - J. SEGLOW, Altruism, 44.

[174] Cf. ibid.

[175] Cf. J. KEKES, “Morality and Impartiality,”:  American Philosophical Quarterly (1981) 18: 295.

[176] Cf. R. DWORKIN, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge 1977) 45.

[177] Cf. ibid., 50.

[178] Cf. Romans 2:11

[179] Cf. N. MAHATHERA, The Buddha and His Teachings (Taiwan 1998) 69.

[180] Cf. Mahabharata, Santi Parva, 56: 2.

[181] B. HOOKER, “When is Impartiality Morally Appropriate?”:  Feltham and Cottingham (2010) 26.

[182] Cf. I. Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 33.

[183] Cf. J. DANCY, Ethics without Principles (Oxford 2004) 78.

[184] Cf. P. SINGER, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”:  Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1972) 229-243.

[185] Cf. R. M. HARE, Moral Thinking (Oxford² 1981) 111.

[186] Cf. ibid., 112.

[187] Cf. Cf. N. SCOTT - J. SEGLOW, Altruism, 51.

[188] Cf. B. BARRY, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford 1995) 133.

[189] Cf. ibid.

[190] Cf. ibid.

[191] Cf. J.S. MILL, Utilitarianism (London² 1863) 44.

[192] Cf. D. MAUZUTIS, “Supererogation Beyond Positive Deviance and Corporate Social Responsibility”: Journal of Business Ethics (2014) 119: 517.

[193] C. ALLEN, “Supererogation”, in: E. N. ZALTA – U. NODELMAN (eds.),  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford 2017) 645.

[194] Cf. T. AQUINAS, Summa Theologica II-II, q.106, a.4, 448.

[195] Cf. Ibid.

[196] J. URMSON, “Saints and Heroes”, in: Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A. MELDEN  (Seattle 1958) 234.

[197] Cf. C. ALLEN, “Supererogation”, in: E. N. ZALTA – U. NODELMAN (eds.),  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , 646.

[198] Cf. T. HILL, “Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation”: Kant-Studien, 62: 58. .

[199] Cf. ibid., 61.

[200] Cf. C. ALLEN, “Supererogation”, in: E. N. ZALTA – U. NODELMAN (eds.),  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , 649.

[201] Cf.ibid., 650.

[202] Cf. ibid., 652.

[203] Cf. ibid., 663.

[204] Cf. ibid., 670.

[205] Cf. ibid., 671.

[206] Cf. J. URMSON, “Saints and Heroes”, in: Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A. MELDEN, 236.

[207] Cf. ibid., 237.